TIME: Almanac 1990/1990 Time Magazine Compact Almanac, The (1991)(Time).iso/time/caps/87/87capcon.4

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                ef▓¼¡ô                                              »««The Admiral Takes the Hit

July 27, 1987

Poindexter says he never told Reagan about the diversion of arms
profits

Throughout his career, John Poindexter had played by the rules.  As a
vice admiral in the U.S. Navy, he was regarded as a painstakingly
efficient officer who paid scrupulous attention to the chain of
command, never challenging his superiors, always following orders to
the letter.  Indeed, one commanding officer characterized Poindexter
as "totally loyal and trustworthy, and a thorough briefer who rarely
interjected his own viewpoints."  But as Ronald Reagan's National
Security Adviser from December 1985 to November 1986, Poindexter told
his questioners last week, he broke that pattern.  In February 1986,
after just two months on the job, he decided to usurp the authority
of his Commander in Chief.

In his testimony before the congressional committees investigating
the Iran-contra affair, Poindexter insisted he and he alone gave
final approval to Lieut. Colonel Oliver North's proposal to take
profits from U.S. arms sales to Iran and divert them to the
Nicaraguan rebel forces.  He claimed to have exercised this authority
without ever telling the President, so as to protect Reagan from the
"politically volatile issue" that subsequently exploded on them.  "I
made the decision," Poindexter declared in an even, mater-of-fact
tone.  "I was convinced that the President would, in the end, thing
it was a good idea.  But I did not want him to be associated with the
decision."

Moreover, Poindexter said, his extraordinary exercise of authority
did not end with the contra diversion.  As the scandal was breaking
last November, Poindexter testified, he destroyed a piece of vital
evidence:  a covert-action finding, drafted by the CIA and signed by
the President in December 1985, that retroactively approved Israel's
shipments of U.S. arms to the Iranians.  The document, said the
admiral, depicted the weapons transactions as a straight arms-for-
hostages swap with Iran rather than a diplomatic effort to establish
contacts with Iranian moderates, as the President has maintained.  "I
thought it was politically embarrassing," said Poindexter of the
finding.  "I tore it up, put it in the burn basket behind my desk."

To the President's supporters, Poindexter's confession was a turning
point in the Iran-contra melodrama, resolving one of the essential
issues of the scandal.  There would be no evidence directly linking
Reagan to the ugly and possibly unlawful use of money garnered by
selling weapons to terrorists.  While the White House staff breathed
a sigh of relief over the admiral's disclosure, Reagan at first
seemed nonchalant.  "What's new about that?" he shrugged.  "I've been
saying that for seven months."

But Poindexter's testimony still has devastating implications.  If
the admiral is to be believed, his story reveals a startling lack of
accountability in the White House.  "If the President didn't know, in
some ways it's more serious than if he did," said House Majority
Leader Thomas Foley.  "Presidents ought to be allowed to create their
own political disasters," said Republican Senator Warren Rudman of
New Hampshire.  "Nobody else ought to do it for them."

Was Reagan's famous management style so lax that his newly appointed
National Security Adviser could feel free to run a highly sensitive
covert operation without ever informing the President or any of his
other top advisers?  White House aides rejected the idea.  The
President, they said, was angry when he learned that Poindexter had
authorized the diversion.  Asserted Chief of Staff Howard Baker:
"The President has said, 'I did not know it, and had I known about
it, I would have stopped it.'  That's the totality of it."
Confronted with the White House statement, Poindexter calmly stuck to
his story that Reagan would have approved his decision.  "People can
draw their own conclusions, I guess," he said.

To some members of the Iranscam committees, Poindexter's testimony
simply did not wash.  "I just don't believe what he says," remarked
Democratic Congressman Louis Stokes of Ohio.  "It does not appear
logical that a man of his intellect and management skills would
arrogate unto himself the responsibility of making a monumental
decision affecting the President."

In fact, the self-portrait drawn by the admiral last week did not
appear logical in several respects:  the naval officer known for his
lack of political savvy making a crucial political judgment call; the
strict by-the-book staff man reborn as a renegade who followed his
own lights in deciding what Reagan should and should not know.  "It
doesn't make any sense," said a committee staffer.  "This man wants
you to believe that he risked the entire presidency on a set of
decisions he thought were either too controversial or too unimportant
to belabor the President with."  Senate Panel Chairman Daniel Inouye
called Poindexter's testimony "incredible, mind boggling, chilling."

The performance fueled rather than stilled speculation in Washington
that Poindexter was the Administration's designated scapegoat for the
scandal.  In earlier testimony North, who was Poindexter's
hyperactive aide at the NSC, claimed he and Director of Central
Intelligence William Casey had often discussed the intricacies of the
Iran-contra operation.  According to North, Casey said the Marine
might have to play the "fall guy," taking blame for the entire
operation if it was ever exposed.  On further consideration, Casey
speculated that North might not be "senior enough" to make a credible
scapegoat:  the CIA director suggested Poindexter would have to share
the role.

Poindexter testified that he had never heard of any scapegoat plan.
But some thought the admiral was indeed falling on his sword for the
sake of Ronald Reagan.  "This man will never say anything that
reflects adversely on his Commander in Chief," said Senate Counsel
Arthur Liman.  "How do we know he's not still protecting the
President?"

Poindexter, 50, related his amazing tale in ordinary, conversational
tones, then broke out his pipe and lit up, as if he had come to the
end of an after-dinner story.  He matter-of-factly told the panel of
the day in February 1986 when North said he had found a way to fund
the contras with profits from the arms sales to Iran.  At the time
the rebels were running out of the $27 million in humanitarian aid
the U.S. had granted them in 1985.  Poindexter saw the diversion
scheme as a way of providing "bridge financing" for the contras while
the Administration struggled to persuade Congress to approve a $100
million aid package.  "I thought it was a neat idea too," Poindexter
said, echoing North's description of the deal.

Poindexter recognized that the diversion would be as controversial as
it was neat.  Thus, he said, he approved it without informing Reagan,
in order to "provide some future deniability for the President if it
ever leaked out."  Poindexter argued that in authorizing the deal he
was not making policy; he was only carrying out Reagan's established
objectives.  "My role was to make sure that his policies were
implemented," said Poindexter.  "In this case, the policy was very
clear, and that was to support the contras."  After working in the
WHite House since June 1981, he said, "I was convinced that I
understood the President's thinking on this."

Poindexter contended that during daily briefings he reported to
Reagan "in general terms" on the status of the contras.  He said he
told the President of North's "instrumental" role in helping sustain
the rebels, filling Reagan in on the secret airstrip built in Costa
Rica by North's contra resupply network.  The admiral said that while
the President knew the rebels were being supported by private
donations and contributions from third countries, he never asked
where precisely the money was coming from.  "The President...is not a
man for great detail," said Poindexter, inadvertently provoking
chuckles from the audience.

Poindexter insisted that he never discussed the division with any
Administration official other than North.  The admiral said he
refrained from talking about the scheme with Casey--even though the
CIA had been deeply involved in previous contra activities.  His
rational was that Casey often had to testify before the congressional
intelligence-oversight committees and Poindexter did not want him to
have to lie.  North, however, told the Iran-contra committees that
Casey knew all about the diversion.

Though Poindexter had the gumption to authorize the diversion, he
seemed not to want to know too much about the deals:  he testified
that he never asked North how much money was being diverted to the
contras; the admiral, known for his attention to detail, said he was
not concerned with such bits of "micro-management."

Poindexter said he cautioned North against putting any information
about contra support on paper.  Nevertheless, North testified that he
sent Poindexter five memorandums, each outlining the details of a
specific transfer of arms proceeds to the contras.  Each paper
recommended briefing the President and seeking his approval of the
transaction.  North said he never knew if Reagan saw the memos, but
he shredded all his copies of the documents when he learned that the
arms deals might come to light.  One memo, however, escaped the
shredder and was discovered by investigators from the Justice
Department.

Poindexter not only denied showing Reagan the surviving memo but said
he could not recall receiving any diversion memos from North.  Under
questioning by Liman, Poindexter said that even if North had sent him
the memos, he would not have discussed any aspect of the diversion
with the President; he had made a "deliberate decision" not to do so.

The first time the admiral could remember seeing the infamous
diversion memo at all was when Meese directly confronted him with it
last Nov. 24.  Poindexter said he promptly offered to resign; on the
following day the Attorney General instructed him to do so.
Strangely, however, Meese never asked Poindexter who approved the
transfer of arms profits to the contras.  Nor did White House Chief
of Staff Donald Regan question Poindexter about the diversion.

An incredulous Liman asked the witness why he did not say, "I,
Admiral Poindexter, made the decision and did not tell the President
of the United States."  Poindexter's lame reply:  although he gave
the notion "a lot of thought," he waited to consult his attorneys.
The result, as Senator Rudman pointed out, was "the agony that we've
had for the last eight months" as Reagan was battered with questions
about his role in the scandal.

At the time of the Meese inquiry, Poindexter said, one of his aides
turned up a finding that authorized U.S. facilitation of a November
1985 sale of 18 Hawk anti-aircraft missiles from Israel to Iran.
Poindexter testified that he watched Reagan sign the document on or
about Dec.5, 1985, his first day as NSC chief.  The problem with this
finding, said Poindexter, was that it depicted the transaction as a
trade of arms for the release of Americans being held hostage in
Lebanon.  The paper would be superseded in January by a finding that
explained the weapons sales and freedom for the hostages as part of a
broad initiative to re-establish diplomatic ties between the U.S. and
Iran.  Poindexter said he had forgotten about the year-old document
until his aide handed it to him last Nov. 21.  Moments later
Poindexter ripped it up and had the scraps incinerated.  Explained
the admiral"  "I simply didn't want this document to see the light of
day."

Poindexter was not alone in forgetting the 1985 finding.  Last winter
Reagan told the Tower commission that he had approved the initial
Hawk shipment before the fact.  The President later told the board
members that he had had no prior awareness of the transaction.
Finally, he wrote a note to the Tower board saying, "The simple truth
is I don't remember--period."  After Poindexter's disclosure last
week, the President still said he does not remember signing the
finding.

Many sections of the admiral's testimony were marred by evasive
answers, confusion over details and awkward twists of logic.  Among
Poindexter's other significant revelations:

-Unlike Robert McFarlane, his predecessor as National Security
Adviser, Poindexter said he did not feel that the NSC staff was
covered by the Boland amendment, which prohibited assistance to the
Nicaraguan rebels by U.S. military or intelligence agencies.
Although the NSC directed the contra-resupply network, Poindexter
told Congress that his agency was adhering to the letter and spirit
of the law.  How so?  "By keeping the other departments that were
covered by the Boland amendment out of the issue."

-After North successfully convinced members of the House Intelligence
Committee that he was not involved in covert support for the contras
in 1986, Poindexter sent his aide a computer message saying, "Well
done."  House Counsel John Nields asked Poindexter last week if he
had authorized North to lie to Congress.  The admiral replied that he
did not instruct North to lie, only to "withhold information."

-North testified that Director Casey had hoped to use some of the
profits from the Iran arms sales to set up a secret account to
finance covert operations without congressional oversight.
Poindexter said he had never heard such a plan discussed "in that
depth."  He added, "It's an idea that has some attractive features in
my mind."

The vigorous, outspoken North had provided a stark contrast to his
seemingly unflappable NSC boss during his six days of sometimes
impassioned testimony.  By the time North left the witness chair last
Tuesday, he had been transformed into an international celebrity.
But in his final hours on the stand, the Marine who had offered the
committee lengthy discourses on patriotism and geopolitics got a dose
of his own medicine.  Most of the 26 panel members lectured North on
his flawed view of democracy and the significance of the scandal.
Senator William Cohen, a Maine Republican, criticized the colonel and
his associates for attempting to act on a contra policy that did not
have the support of most Americans.  "A democracy demands not only
that the rights of the minority be respected," said Cohen, "but that
the rules of the majority be respected.  And that's true even if you
and I believe the majority is wrong."

Indiana Democrat Lee Hamilton, chairman of the House panel and a
widely respected student of foreign affairs, summed up the serious
implications of the scandal with special eloquence.  "I am impressed
that policy was driven by a series of lies," said Hamilton in a soft,
steady baritone.  "Lies to the Iranians, lies to the CIA, lies to the
Attorney General, lies to our friends and allies, lies to the
Congress and lies to the American people."  Hamilton reminded North
of one of Thomas Jefferson's credos:  "The whole art of government
consists in the art of being honest."

Poindexter's testimony revealed even more layers of deceptions
obscuring what really happened in the tortuous Iran-contra affair.
After the admiral's dubious story, members of the investigation may
suspect that they will never hear the full truth about the scandal.

--By Jacob V. Lamar Jr.
  Reported by Michael Duffy and Hays Gorey/Washington